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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the decision of the District Court, First Judicial District, Kootenai 
County, Lansing Haynes presiding, of the granting ofa motion for possession under I.C. § 7-721 
in a condenmation action brought by the State ofIdaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("Board"). 
(i) Nature of the case. 
This dispute arises out of condenmation proceedings brought by the Plaintiff, Idaho 
Transportation Board ("Board") to acquire and condemn certain real property owned by H.J. 
Grathol ("Grathol") located at the intersection of State Highway 54 and U.s. 95 in Kootenai 
County, Idaho. The Board initiated an action for condenmation of the Grathol property by filing 
a Complaint with the District Court then shortly thereafter petitioned the court for an order of 
immediate possession pending a trial on the determination of just compensation. Grathol 
opposed the Board's request for possession asserting that the Board failed to allege or 
demonstrate each required element under I.C. § 7-721. Grathol argued that the Board's 
Complaint failed to contain all necessary elements to allow the District Court to consider the 
request and that the Board failed to properly exercise its power of eminent domain, including a 
failure of the Board to approve the condenmation through an Order of Condenmation as required 
by I.C. § 7-707(6). Grathol also argued that inconsistencies and ambiguity existed as a result of 
conflicting descriptions of the property to be condenmed in the Complaint and the private 
property rights implicated in the Order of Condemnation ("Order") which was issued by the 
Board's delegee (the Idaho Transportation Department) in contravention of the statute. This 
conflict violated Idaho's requirements that a condenmee be provided a clear indication of each 
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property right and interest to be acquired by the condemnor. Finally, Grathol argued that as a 
result of failing to identify, acknowledge and offer just compensation for each property interest 
affected by the condemnation, the Board failed to use good faith efforts to acquire the property 
prior to requesting early possession. The District Court found that the Board satisfied each 
element ofLC. § 7-721 and granted the Board's motion for early possession and Grathol appeals 
therefrom. 
(ii) Course of the proceedings below and its disposition. 
On November 17, 2010, the Board filed a Complaint for eminent domain seeking to 
condemn a portion of Grathol's real property. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-18.) Grathol's counsel accepted 
service on December 9,2010. (R. Vol. I, pp. 54-55.) On December 21,2010, the Board filed its 
Motion for Order Granting Possession of Real Property and Memorandum in Support. (R. Vol. I, 
pp.59-66.) On December 23,2010, Grathol filed its Answer to Complaint. (R. Vol. I, pp. 77-81.) 
In its Answer, Grathol alleged affirmative defenses including lack of jurisdiction and that the 
Board's actions were taken in violation of its statutory authority or were void as a violation of 
Idaho's Open Meeting law. (R. Vol. I, pp. 79-80.) 
On January 10, 2011, Grathol filed its Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Order Granting 
Possession of Real Property and supporting affidavits. (R. Vol. I, pp. 90-130.) On January 18, 
2011, the Board filed a Reply Brief and supporting affidavits. CR. Vol. I, pp. 132-230, Vol. II, pp. 
231-294.) 
On January 21, 2011 the District Court held a hearing on lTD's Motion for Possession. 
During that hearing, the Board argued that it had satisfied all requirements ofI.C. § 7-721 and was 
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entitled to an innnediate order of possession of Grathol's property. (Tr. pp. 3-5, 11. 23-25, 1-25, 1-
14, pp. 40-44.) The Board presented two witnesses to testifY in support of its motion. (Tr. pp. 7-
39.) In opposition, Grathol argued that the Board was not entitled to early possession of the real 
property because it had not satisfied all of the elements ofIdaho Code 7-721(2), specifically parts 
(a) and (d). (Tr. pp. 5-6, II. 22-25,1-15, pp. 44-52.) 
The District· Court declined to issue a written decision and announced its findings and 
conclusions on the record. (Tr. pp. 57-58, II. 17-25, 1~4.) The District Court granted the Board's 
Motion finding that the elements ofLe. § 7-721 had been met and that the Complaint satisfied the 
elements ofLC. § 7-707. (Tr. pp. 57-65.) The District Court also certified the decision as final for 
review. (Tr. pp. 67-68, II. 7-25,1-18.) 
On January 21, 2011, the District Court executed the Order Granting Possession of Real 
Property. (R. Vol. II, pp. 303-06.) On January 25, 2011, the District Court entered a Rule 54(b) 
Certificate, nunc pro tunc. (R. Vol. II, pp. 301-02.) On February 1,2011, Grathol appealed the 
District Court's Order. (R. Vol. II, pp. 311-14.) On February 15,2011, this Court issued an Order 
Suspending Appeal, pending the receipt of a Judgment. On March 4, 2011, a Judgment was entered 
by the District Court and the appeal continued. (R. Vol. II, pp. 351-52.) 
(iii) Concise statement of the facts. 
On or about June 17, 2010, the Board acting through the Idaho Transportation 
Department ("lTD") made an offer to purchase a portion of Grathol's land located at the 
intersection of State Highway 54 and U.S. 95 in Kootenai County, Idaho. (Tr. pp. 17, II. 12-21.) 
The offer included a copy of an appraisal by Stanley Moe. The appraisal placed a value for the 
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16.314 acres of physical land being taken. The offer and appraisal did not evaluate or consider 
any impacts of the extension of Sylvan Road across the Grathol property. (Tr. pp. 30-31, II. 8-
25, 1.) 
Grathol rejected the offer and met with ITD's representatives on or about August 1, 2010 
to discuss the offer and clarify lTD's intentions for construction. (Tr. pp. 18-19,11. 22-25,1-18.) 
At that meeting, Gratho1 raised the issue of the extension of Sylvan Road across its property and 
the impacts that would have. (Tr. pp. 19, n. 16-18.) lTD refused to offer any remuneration or 
consider the impacts of the Sylvan Road extension. As such, the parties were unable to come to 
an agreement. (Tr. pp. 21, n. 19-20.) lTD claims that after the August meeting it had no further 
plans to condemn or construct Sylvan Road across the Grathol property. (Tr. pp. 21, n. 21-24.) 
On November 17, 2010, an Order of Condemnation for the Grathol property was 
authorized and executed by ITD's Director. (R. Vol. l, pp. 16-18.) No members of the Board 
signed or acknowledged the Order of Condemnation. Id. While the Board held a regular 
meeting on that same date (Nov. 1 t\ the minutes do not reflect any discussion of the Order by 
the Board or any motion or action on the same. (R. Vol. l, pp. 114-20.) On November 19, 2010, 
the Board filed its Complaint for condemnation. The Complaint included a legal description of 
the Grathol property, maps and a copy ofthe Order as exhibits. (R. Vol. I, pp. 7-18.) The Order 
includes a specific designation of the extension of Sylvan Road as part of the "Project." (R. Vol. 
I, pp. 17.) 
Prior to answering the Complaint, Grathol attempted to stipulate with lTD for early 
possession of the property, again raising the issue of Sylvan Road. On December 21, 20 I 0, the 
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Board filed its Motion for Order Granting Possession of Real Property. (R. Vol. I, pp. 59-66.) On 
Decembei23, 2010, Grathol filed its Answer. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Grathol believes that the following questions accurately summarize the issues on appeal: 
1) Did the Board properly initiate an action for condemnation in accordance with Idaho 
Code § 7-707 prior to moving for early possession of the Grathol property? - (i.e. Did the Board 
properly exercise its authority to condemn?) 
a. Does the Board's Complaint contain a binding Order of Condemnation in 
accordance with Idaho Code § 7-707(6)? 
b. Does the description of the property contained in the Complaint comport 
with the property description and interests identified in the Order of Condemnation? 
2) Did the Board make a good faith effort to bargain for and acquire all property 
implicated in the condemnation action prior to requesting an Order for Possession from the District 
Court? 
3) If Grathol prevails on appeal, should it be entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Idaho 
Code §12-1I7? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue of whether a civil complaint for condemnation complies with Idaho's statutes 
involves a question of law and is, therefore, subject to free review. Ada County Highway Dist. v. 
Sharp, 135 Idaho 888, 891, 26 P.3d 1225, 1228, (Ct.App. 2001), citing, Mitchell v. Bingham, 130 
Idaho 420, 422, 942 P .2d 544, 546 (1997). 
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The construction and application of a legislative act presents pure questions of law and 
this Court reviews such questions freely. Fox v. State, 129 Idaho 881, 883, 934 P.2d 947, 949 
(Ct.App.1997); State v. Browning, 123 Idaho 748, 749, 852 P.2d 500, 501 (Ct.App.1993); and 
Mitchell v. Bingham Mem'/ Hasp., 130 Idaho 420, 422, 942 P.2d 544,546 (1997). 
In an eminent domain action, the only issue for the jury is compensation for the land and 
the damages thereto. The issue of whether a taking occurred is a question of law for the trial 
court to determine. Tibbs v. City a/Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 670, 603 P.2d 1001, 1004 (1979). 
Because it is a question of law, it is a question subject to free review. Reisenauer v. State, Dept. 
a/Highways, 120 Idaho 36, 38, 813 P.2d 375,377 (Ct. App. 1991). 
ARGUMENT 
I. DID THE IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD FILE A COMPLAINT IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH IDAHO CODE § 7-707 BEFORE MOVING FOR EARLY 
POSSESSION OF THE GRA THOL PROPERTY? 
In Idaho, a proceeding for eminent domain commences with the filing of a complaint and 
issuance of a surmnons in the local district court where the property is situated. I.C. § 7-706. A 
complaint for condemnation must contain each of the mandatory elements set forth in Idaho Code § 
7-707. I.C. § 7-707. The word "must," when appearing in legislation, has an imperative and 
mandatory meaning. State ex reI. Parsons v: Bunting Tractor Co., 58 Idaho 617, 77 P.2d 464, 
466 (1938); Lee v. Stevens, 22 Idaho 670, 127 P. 680 (1912). "Must" does not mean "may." The 
Idaho Supreme Court has expressly held that the pleading requirements ofLC. § 7-707 are not to 
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be lightly regarded and must be satisfied before an action for eminent domain may be 
entertained. See e.g., State ex rei. Rich v. Bair, 83 Idaho 475, 365 P.2d 216 (1961). J 
Because the District Court does not even acquire jurisdiction in an eminent domain 
proceeding until a complaint is filed containing all of Section 701' s elements; a condemning agency 
may not proceed with a request for early possession of a defendant's property. Strict compliance 
with I.C. § 7-707 is mandatory; not optional. 
A. The Order of Condemnation does not comply with Idaho Code § 7-707(6). 
Idaho Code § 7-707 provides, in pertinent part: 
The complaint must contain: 
* * * 
6. An order of condemnation, or resolution, or other official and 
binding document entered by the plaintiff which sets forth and 
clearly identifies all property rights to be acquired including rights 
to and from the public way, and permanent and temporary 
easements known or reasonably identifiable to the condemning 
authority .... 
The Complaint, filed November 19, 2010 states at , 20: 
The Idaho Transportation Board has determined that the Property 
is necessary for the above-described Project and has issued an 
Order of Condemnation. A true and correct copy of the Idaho 
Transportation Board's Order of Condemnation is attached hereto 
as Exhibit C, and by this reference made a part hereof as if set out 
in full herein. 
J See also, Lakes Highway District v. Hammrich, Kootenai County Case No. CV -07 -7897 (2007) 
wherein the District Court granted landowner's motion to dismiss the Highway District's 
condemnation complaint for Plaintiff's failure to strictly follow Idaho Code § 7-707(6) and 
include a binding order or resolution of condemnation issued by the District. 
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(R. Vol. I, p. 5.) Attached to the Complaint, as Exhibit C is a copy of the "Order of 
Condenmation" dated November 17, 2010 (hereinafter "Order"). (R. Vol. I, pp. 16-18.) 
However, the Order attached to the Complaint fails to satisfy the requirements ofLC. § 7-707(6). 
It is not an Order of the Board of Transportation, was never approved by action of the Board of 
Transportation, and is not signed by a single member of the Board of Transportation. Therefore, 
the Order cannot qualify as "an official and binding document entered by the plaintiff. ,,2 The 
Idaho Transportation Department is an executive department of the State of Idaho. Its head is 
the Idaho Transportation Board (I.C. § 40-501), but neither the Department nor its Director is a 
member of the Board. The Idaho Transportation Board is the sole body vested with the 
authority, control, supervision and administration of the Department. I.C. § 40-301. The Board, 
is composed of seven members appointed by the Governor. I.C. § 40-302. For purposes of 
legislative enactments which refer to the Board (but not the Department) the two entities cannot 
be considered synonymous.3 
Chapter 3, Title 40 of the Idaho Code provides for the qualifications of Board members, 
the governance and structure of the Board and the Board's meeting and reporting requirements. 
The Chapter also provides the Board express powers and duties. Examples of such powers and 
duties include determining which highways shall be designated as part of the state highway 
system (I.C. § 40-310), establishing rules and regulations for the expenditure of all moneys 
2 The plaintiff here is the Idaho Transportation Board, as required by I.C. § 7-707(1). 
3 Statues setting forth the structure and authority of the Idaho Transportation Department are 
found in I.C. § 40-501, et seq. The only mention of the powers of condenmation in Title 40, 
Chapter 5 is the Department's authority to acquire advertising displays and property rights 
pertaining to them. See, I.C. § 40-506(1). 
-8-
appropriated to the Department (I.e. § 40-312), and most importantly, the Board (and only the 
Board) is granted the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain (I. C. § 40-311 (1)). The 
enabling legislation provides that the Board shall: 
Purchase, exchange, condemn or otherwise acquire, any real 
property, either in fee or in any lesser estate Of interest, rights-of-
way, easements and other rights and rights of direct access from 
the property abutting highways with controlled access, deemed 
necessary by the board for present or future state highway 
purposes. The order of the board that the land sought is necessary 
for such use shall be prima facie evidence of that fact. 
I.C. § 40-311(1) (emphasis added). 
The legislature's grant of express powers and duties (or more specifically, the right to 
delegate express powers) relative to highways was examined in Roberts v. Transportation Dept., 
121 Idaho 727, 827 P.2d 1178 (Ct. App. 1991). Roberts appealed a district court's entry of 
surmnary judgment for the Department of Transportation, dismissing a wrongful death action 
brought by the widow (Roberts) of a motorist killed in a collision. Roberts claimed that the 
Department was negligent in failing to erect and maintain proper traffic control signs, in 
violation of its express statutory duties. Id. at 730,827 P.2d 1181. The Department moved for 
summary judgment claiming that no duties were owed and that it was immune from liability. Id. 
Summary judgment was granted. On appeal, the Roberts Court found that the Department had 
both the authority and express duty to place and maintain proper signs at highway intersections, 
relying on I.C. § 40-310(12) and § 40-313(1). Id. The Department argued that a manual it had 
adopted pursuant to its rule making authority expressly restricted the Department's authority to 
place any signs beyond its own right-of-way. Id. The Roberts Court rejected this, holding that 
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when the legislature enacts a statute requiring that the Department carry out specific functions, it 
(the Department) could not validly subvert the legislation by promulgating contradictory rules. 
An administrative agency is limited to the power and authority 
granted it by the legislature. Such delegated authority is primary 
and exclusive in the absence of a clearly manifested expression to 
the contrary. An agency must exercise any authority granted by 
statute within the framework of that statutory grant. It may not 
exercise its sub-legislative powers to modify, alter, enlarge or 
diminish the provisions of the legislative act which is being 
administered. (Internal citations omitted.) 
Id. at 732, 827 P.2d 1183 (emphasis added). The Roberts majority held that the district court 
erred in ruling that the Department had no legal duty to conduct any activity outside of its right-
of-way when the express legislative intent said otherwise. Id. 
1. The Board never approved the condemnation of the Grathol property. 
As a body politic, the Board must hold regular meetings for the purpose of transacting 
business. I.C. § 40-308. Additionally, a quorum is necessary to hold a meeting requiring the 
presence of a majority of the members of the Board. Id. A majority of all members of the Board 
must authorize any act by the Board. Id. 
Both the Department and the Board are considered public agencies and are subject to the 
requirements of Idaho's Open Meeting laws. I.e. § 67-2341.4 Idaho's Open Meeting laws 
require that all meetings of a governing body shall be open to the public and any action, 
deliberation or decision making that leads to an action occurring at any meeting failing to 
4 "Public agency" means: (a) any state board, commission, department, authority, educational 
institution or other state agency which is created by or pursuant to statute .... I.C. § 67-2341(4) 
(emphasis added). 
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comply with the open meeting requirements shall be null and void. I.C. § 67-2347. "Decision" 
is defined under I.C. § 67-2341 as "any determination, action, vote or final disposition upon a 
motion, proposal, resolution, order, ordinance or measure on which a vote of a governing body is 
required, at any meeting at which a quorum is present." 
At issue in this appeal is the legality of the Order of Condemnation attached to the 
Complaint. The Order purports to satisfy the statutory requirements of I.C. § 7-707(6), requiring 
"an order of condemnation, or resolution, or other official and binding document entered by the 
plaintiff .... " (emphasis added) However, the Plaintiff is not the Department of Transportation; 
it is the Idaho Transportation Board. 
A cursory review of the Exhibit C, attached to the Compliant reveals that the Order was 
never approved by the Board. (R. Vol. I, pp. 16-18.) The Order itself is littered with signatures, 
but none by the Board or any of its members; it is "recommended" by a Right of Way Manager, 
"approved" by a Chief Engineer, "approved as to form" by legal counsel, and signed by ITD' s 
Director, whose signature is attested to by a management assistant. However, none of those 
persons are the Plaintiff in the action. The Plaintiff is the Board. The Order does not contain 
any actual signatures, words of ratification or other evidence of approval by the Board itself. 
Instead, the Order was simply "approved" by the Director of the Department. (R. Vol. I, p. 18.) 
First, among the mandatory elements of the Complaint as required by statute is this: 
7-707. Complaint 
The complaint must contain: 
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1. The name of the corporation, association, commission or 
person in charge of the public use for which the property is sought, 
who must be styled plaintiff. 
Idaho Code § 7-707(1). This requirement is not optional or discretionary. It is mandatory that 
the condenmor be the named plaintiff; not a delegee, designee or assignee of that right. Here the 
"styled" plaintiff is the Board, not the Department. 
It is undisputed in the record on appeal that the Board· itself did not take any actions to 
approve the Order on the date of its execution. In fact, the record fails to establish that the Board 
even considered the Order on the date it was executed. The Minutes of the Board's regular 
meeting on November 17, 2010, contain no motion, action, vote or mention of the Order. (R. 
Vol. I, pp. 114-120.) Indeed, the Minutes demonstrate that there was no discussion or action 
taken on the Order at all, nor any discussion of the instant litigation, which was also filed shortly 
thereafter. 
The Board does not content that it took any action on November 1 i h to approve the 
Order or took any subsequent actions to ratify the approval and execution of the Order. Instead 
the Board presents three separate arguments that the Order is a legally binding document in 
compliance with I.C. § 7-707(6). These arguments are: 
1) That the Board has delegated authority to its director to authorize and execute 
Orders of Condenmation through an internal policy; 
2) That it has previously approved the "Project" in general, via annual approval of 
Idaho's Statewide Improvement Program ("STIP"), and 
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3) That Idaho's Legislature "pre-approved" the Order through its enactment of I.e. § 
40-315 in 2005. 
Rather than simply taking an action to issue, approve or directly ratify the Order, the 
Board asks this Court to indulge in judicial alchemy to identify actions indirectly approving the 
instant condemnation. None of the Board's suggested methods of "approval" for the required 
Order have legal support and all are in contravention to the strict requirements of Idaho Code's 
statutory eminent domain provisions. 
a. The Board does not have the ability to delegate its statutory authority to 
authorize and execute an Order of Condemnation to the director of the Department. 
The Board first argues that it approved the Order vis-ii-vis the director who authorized 
and executed the Order on November 17,2010. Claiming, "[T]he Director has both statutory 
and administrative authority to execute administrative orders of condemnation once public 
highway projects are approved by the Board." (R. Vol. I, p. 3.) The Board argues I.C. §§ 40-
505 and 40-314 provide statutory authority for this delegation of authority. However, even 
cursory reading of these statutes proves otherwise. While some functions may clearly be 
delegated by the Board; a function as constitutionally important as the issuance of a 
condemnation order is not one of them. 
The director of the Idaho Transportation Department is a technical and administrative 
officer appointed by the Board, who serves at its pleasure. I.C. §§ 40-503, 505. I.e. § 40-505 
provides: 
The director shall be ... under the board's control, supervision and 
direction, shall have general supervision and control of all 
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activities, functions and employees of the department. He shall 
enforce all provisions of the laws of the state relating to the 
department, the rules and regulations of the board, and shall 
exercise all necessary incidental powers. 
I.C. § 40-505. By this legislative description, the director is limited to administering the Board's 
decisions and is not provided statutory authority to make independent decisions for the Board. 
While the Board has the ability to retain employees for the administration of its functions, the 
Board does not have the power to delegate specific decision making functions to administrative 
officers or employees. 
The Board also argues that I.C. § 40-314 provides it with the ability to delegate such 
authority to its director pursuant to its "rule making authority." If this reasoning is followed to 
its logical conclusion, the Board could adopt a "rule" divesting itself of all statutorily imposed 
duties and simply delegate those duties to someone else. Clearly, that would be inconsistent with 
the legislature's intent in creating the Board in the first place. I.C. § 40-314 provides: 
The board shall: ... 
(3) Exercise any other powers and duties, including the adoption of 
rules and regulations, deemed necessary to fully implement and 
carry out the provisions of this title and the control of the financial 
affairs of the board and the department. 
I.C. § 40-314(3). The Board argues that it established a policy delegating authority to the 
director to effectuate orders of condemnation. In support, the Board submitted a portion of 
Policy B-03-01 5, as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Karl Vogt, which provides, in pertinent part: 
5 It is not insignificant that adoption of a "policy" carries with it none of the due process 
components required for the adoption of "rules and regulations ... " referenced in § 40-314 which 
would be subject to the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, I.e. § 67-5201, et seq. 
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"The Director is further delegated authority to authorize and execute on behalf of the Board an 
Order of Condemnation for individual parcels ofland." (R. Vol. I, pp. 173-74.) Policy B-03-01 
is dated August 20, 2008.6 What the Board ignores, however, is that this "policy" conflicts with 
the statutory language ofI.C. § 7-707(6). Policy B-03-01 remains in substantially the same form 
as it existed prior to the addition ofLC. § 7-707(6) in 2006.7 
It is clear from the Board's own policy that the delegation of authority to the Director is 
not simply limited only to executing orders of condemnation. Instead, Policy No. B-03-01 
delegates to the Director the authority to authorize and execute on behalf of the Board such 
orders. While the Board downplays the actualverbage of its own policy, it is clear that the 
attempted delegation to the Director is not limited to just executing orders, but instead grants the 
power to authorize condemnation actions as well. That delegation of authority is in direct 
conflict with I.C. § 40-311(1) which expressly reserves such power exclusively to the Board. 
It is well settled that legislative and discretionary powers cannot be delegated by a 
municipality, unless expressly authorized by the statute conferring that power. Untranuneled 
discretion vested by ordinance in an administrative officer without some direction or rule for 
guidance has frequently been deemed an unlawful delegation of authority. McQuillin Mun. Corp., 
§ 10.40.1 0 (3rd Ed). 
6 Policy No. B-03-01 was reviewed and re-adopted by the Board on August 20, 2008. On April 
17, 2008, the Board reviewed the applicability of the policy and revised the policy to include 
administrative settlement language. (Board Minutes 3/17/08, at R. Vol. II, p. 276.) 
7 Senate Bill No. 1243, as amended, was adopted effective July 1, 2006, adding subsection 6, 
requiring an order of condemnation entered by the plaintiff to be attached to a complaint for 
condemnation. (R. Vol. I, pp. 126-130.) 
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So far as the powers of municipal corporations are legislative they 
rest in the discretion and judgment of the municipal body entrusted 
with them, and the general rule is that the body cannot delegate or 
refer the exercise of such powers to the judgment of a committee 
of the council, or to an administrative officer of the city... If the 
legislature confers power on a municipal corporation, the exercise 
of discretion by the governing body of the municipality cannot be 
delegated to a municipal officer or other person or body, and the 
general rule is that, if from the nature of things to be done, a 
municipal officer is required to perform duties involving the 
exercise of discretion and judgment, that officer cannot in any 
manner delegate them. 
McQuillin Mun. Corp., § 10.40 (3rd Ed). An ordinance fixing no guide or rule whatever for the 
exercise of executive or administrative discretion leaving the whole matter to be determined by the 
officer, is an unwarranted delegation of power. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064 
(1886). 
A delegation of discretionary authority becomes especially suspect in the context of 
eminent domain because it implicates a fundamental, constitutional property right. For this 
reason, when interpreting powers of eminent domain granted by specific legislation, the statutes 
are to be strictly construed and the material requirements of the statute must be strictly followed. 
In delegating the power of eminent domain to a municipality, the 
legislature may impose conditions which require the municipality 
to do more than is exacted by the constitutional provisions, and if 
the municipality exercises the power so delegated, it cannot evade 
or ignore the conditions. 
McQuillin Mun. Corp., § 32.15 (3rd Ed). 
Statutes generally prescribe the procedure by which the right of 
eminent domain may be exercised. Unless it is otherwise provided, 
these statutes are to be strictly construed and the material 
requirements of the statute as to procedure must be strictly 
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followed or, at least, observed with a reasonable degree of 
strictness .... 
The record must disclose due observance of all jurisdictional 
requirements, and omissions cannot be supplied by intendment or 
implication. If it does not affirmatively appear on the face of the 
proceeding that every essential prerequisite of the law conferring 
jurisdiction has been observed in substance, the proceedings will 
be void. 
McQuillin Mun. Corp., § 32.119 (3rd Ed). 
Indeed, Idaho Courts agree that the exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State 
must be carefully calculated and the procedures precisely followed: 
A grant of the power of eminent domain, which is one of the 
attributes of sovereignty most fraught with the possibility of abuse 
and injustice, will never pass by implication; and when the power 
is granted, the extent to which the power exercised is limited to the 
express terms or clear implication of the statute in which the grant 
is contained. In other words, statutes conferring the power must be 
strictly construed. 
McKenney v. Anselmo, 91 Idaho 118 123,416 P.2d 509, 514 (1966) (emphasis added), quoting, 
26 AmJur.2d, Eminent Domain, s 18, pp. 659-661. See also, State ex rel. Rich v. Bair, 83 Idaho 
475, 365 P.2d 216 (1961), (holding that the requirements of Idaho Code § 7-707 are not to be 
lightly disregarded and must be satisfied before an action in eminent domain may be 
commenced). 
Most other jurisdictions similarly interpret express grants of statutory authority in 
eminent domain and their reasoning is instructive. In Cowlitz County v. Martin, 142 Wash.App. 
860, 177 P.3d 102 (2008), the plaintiff brought a condemnation action to acquire an expanded 
easement over condemnee's property for a culvert. The county board of commissioners passed a 
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resolution authorizing its prosecuting attorney to file a petition for condemnation. Id. at 862, 177 
P 3d 103. The resolution provided (in accordance with the controlling statute) that, as grounds 
for the condemnation, the existing culvert was a barrier to fish passage under the Salmon 
Recovery Act and the need to replace it constituted a public use of the property. The petition for 
condemnation authored by the prosecuting attorney included an additional allegation that the 
existing culvert was inadequate to accommodate historic stream flows. Id. at 863,177 P.3d 103. 
The landowner argued, inter alia, that the court lacked jurisdiction for the condemnation 
because; 1) the county acted without authority when it condemned the property for salmon 
passage, and 2) the prosecuting attorney sought the condemn on grounds not mentioned by the 
commissioners' resolution (accommodation of historic stream flows). The trial court granted the 
petition for condemnation on both grounds and an appeal was taken. 
On appeal, the Cowlitz Court held that "delegation of the State's sovereign power of 
eminent domain to the State's political subdivisions must be expressly given or necessarily 
implied, and statutes conferring such power must be strictly construed." Id. at 864, 177 P.3d 
104. Because adequate stream flow was not mentioned in the county's resolution and instead 
was only first advanced by the county's prosecuting attorney when filing the complaint, the 
Court found that the record did not reflect that the commissioners considered or were even aware 
of the issue of historic stream flow when they made their finding that condemnation was 
necessary. Id. at 864-85, 177 P .2d 104. 
The Cowlitz Court further held that "the necessity and expediency of exercising the 
power of eminent domain are to be decided by the grantee of the power." Id. at 867, 177 P .2d 
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106. Washington's statutes granted the power of eminent domain to counties, who in turn must 
exercise that authority through their respective Board of Commissioners. The Court held that it 
was the county commissioners who must determine the necessity requiring the condemnation, 
and the prosecuting attorney had no independent authority to articulate additional purposes for 
the condemnation. 
While Idaho courts have not specifically considered the delegability of the power of 
eminent domaln to an administrator or agency employee, they have strictly construed the 
authority of specific grants of power to other political subdivisions. This leads to the inescapable 
conclusion that Idaho, like most other jurisdictions, favors a policy of strict statutory compliance 
when it comes to delegation of significant governmental authority. 
For example, in Terrazasv. Blaine County ex reI. Bd. ofCom'rs, 147 Idaho 193,207 P.3d 
169 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court examined the legislative grant of authority to regulate 
subdivision applications. In Terrazas, the landowner utilized a short plat procedure and received 
a favorable recommendation from the planning and zoning administrator. The Blaine County 
Board of County Commissioners, however, found that a thorough review by the P&Z 
Commission was necessary. After the P&Z Commission concluded its review, it recommended 
that the Board deny the application. [d. at 196, 207 P.3d 172. The Board rejected the staff 
recommendation, adopted the Commission's recommendations, and denied the application. An 
appeal was taken under the Local Land Use and Planning Act and the Idaho Administrative 
Procedures Act. On appeal, landowner argued that the Board exceeded its authority by reaching 
a decision different from that of the P &Z Staff/Administrator because local ordinances granted 
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final subdivision approval authority to the Administrator. The Terrazas Court disagreed, noting 
that under I.C. § 67-6504, county boards are vested with the exclusive, non-delegable authority 
to finally approve subdivision applications and the local ordinances did not delegate such final 
approval to the P & Z Administrator.8 ld. at 199-200, 207 P.3d 175-76. Because the Board 
retained the exclusive legislative authority, the recommendations of the P &Z Administrator 
could not bind the Board's final decision, lest it strip their "sole statutory authority" to approve 
or deny subdivision applications. ld. at 20 I, 207 P 3d 177. 
In the case at bar, the Transportation Board has effectively delegated the authority to 
exercise its (statutory) powers of eminent domain to an administrator. This delegation is 
impermissible. Title 7, Chapter 7, Idaho Code requires a reasoned and deliberate consideration 
of the impact of each condemnation action and a consideration of all property rights implicated. 
The Board avoids these express statutory duties to carefully deliberate and consider the effect of 
eminent domain on the Grathol property, by granting its express statutory duty to an 
administrator to "authorize and execute" Orders of Condemnation. 
The Board argues that this delegation of authority is permissible by reason of I.C. §§ 40-
314 and 40-505. Those provisions generally provide that the Board may adopt rules and 
regulations and the Director shall "exercise all necessary incidental powers." (Italics added.) 
The Board argues that this provision allows it to delegate the authority to exercise eminent 
8 I.C. § 67-6504 provides in pertinent part: "If a governing board does not elect to exercise the 
powers conferred by this chapter, it shall establish ... a planning and zoning commission ... , 
which may act with the fun authority of the governing board, excluding the authority ... to finally 
approve land subdivisions." 
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domain. First, the exercise of eminent domain can hardly be considered an "incidental" power. 
Second, a basic tenet of statutory construction is that the more specific statute or section 
addressing the issue controls over the statute that is more general. Thus, the more general statute 
should not be interpreted as encompassing an area already covered by one which is more 
specific. Mulder v. Liberty Nw. Ins. Co., 135 Idabo 52, 57, 14 P.3d 372, 377 (2000). The 
Board's argument, if true, nullifies the express statutory mandate in I.C. § 7-707(6) that the 
Board (not some delegee), consider and execute the Order of Condemnation. 
Grathol's arguments in this regard are not simply academic. Idabo Code requires a 
careful deliberation and consideration of the necessity of each condemnation; as such 
proceedings involve a particularly high burden to be placed on condemnors. As the exercise of 
eminent domain is one area most fraught with the potential for abuse, the Idaho Legislature has 
required a deliberate and precise procedure before a public entity is permitted to condemn private 
property. The legislature has specifically given that authority to the Board only. The Board's 
cavalier approach to eminent domain proceedings eliminates that individual consideration by the 
Board and invites abuse. This passing-off of authority and responsibility is not authorized by the 
statutes and it is contrary to the intent of the enabling legislation. 
This case exemplifies why the delegation by the Board to the Department is impermissible. 
There is no showing that Board was even aware that the Grathol property exists, much less 
undertook any particularized analysis of the take and its impact on the property. As in Cowlitz v. 
Martin, 142 Wash.App. 860, 177 P.3d 102 (Ct.App. 2008), it is the Board which must consider the 
implications of an action for eminent domain and must consider the necessity for such actions and 
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the properly interest implicated. The Board does not have the right or ability to side step its 
statutory duties by adopting an internal "policy" that directly conflicts with statutory provisions 
granting authority and duties to the Board. See, Roberts v. Transportation Dept., 121 Idaho 727, 
827 P.2d 1178 (Ct. App. 1991). Any such carte blanche authority granted via an internal policy 
cannot supplant the express duties imposed by the legislature. 
Because the Order of Condemnation is completely devoid of approval or action by the 
Board, and the Board has not presented any evidence of an action taken to approve the Order, or to 
ratify it, there was no legal Order of Condemnation and the Complaint failed to meet the 
requirements ofLC. § 7-707(6). 
b. The Board does not comply with Idaho Code § 7-707 through annual STIP 
approval for funding. 
The Board argues that it took an action to approve the condemnation of Grathol's property, 
and thus the Order of Condemnation, through its annual approval of STIP funding for "the Project." 
This argument is too absurd to even merit serious consideration. If the only action taken by the 
Board was via its annual appropriation of STIP funds and approval of "the Project" in general, then 
the Board has clearly not met its statutory and constitutional responsibility to issue an Order of 
Condemnation for the properly. 
Instead of directly considering the necessity of the condemnation of Grathol's property as 
required by law, the Board suggests that it "pre-approved" the condemnation action of Grathol's 
properly through its annual approval ofIdaho's STIP. 
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To evaluate this argument, it is important to understand, what exactly, STIP is and what 
action the Board has taken. 
Statewide Transportation Improvement Program (STIP) means a 
statewide prioritized listing or program of transportation projects 
covering a period of four years that is consistent with the long-range 
statewide transportation plan, as well as metropolitan transportation 
plans and Transportation Improvement Programs, and required for 
projects to be eligible for federal funding under Title 23 U.S.C. and 
Title 49 U.S.C. Chapter 53. 
Idaho Transportation Department, Idaho's FY200 1-20 14 Statewide Transportation Improvement 
Program (STIP), p.10, available at http://www.itd.idaho.gov/planninglstip. "The STIP is not 
just a document, but a fully integrated transportation planning process for transportation planning 
and transportation project selection. The STIP is updated annually and follows this planning 
cycle closely to ensure that projects are identified, selected, and prioritized." Idaho 
Transportation Department, Statewide Transportation Improvement Program (STIP), at 
http://www.itd.idaho.gov/planning/stip.Thus.STIP is a funding and planning mechanism, not a 
substitute for the statutory requirements of eminent domain. Consider its language: 
WHEREAS the Program contains a list of priority transportation 
projects to be carried out in the first three years of the STIP and is 
in conformance with the first three years of each Metropolitan 
Planning Organizations Metropolitan Transportation Improvement 
Program (MTIP); and 
* * * 
WHEREAS the STIP contains sufficient descriptive material to 
identify the project or phase, estimated costs, amounts of federal 
duns proposed to be obligated during each program year, proposed 
category of federal funds and source(s) of non federal funds for the 
first year and likely categories and sources for the second through 
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fourth years, and identification of the agencies responsible for 
carrying out those projects ... 
(R. Vol. I, pp. 190-91.) 
The Board argues that it has approved STIP annually since 2005 and that such approval 
included approval of "the Project" and thus the condemnation of Grathol's property. The Board 
argues that the US 95-Garwood to Sagle Project is identified as "Project Key No. 09791" in as 
early as 2005 and that the Board has repeatedly approved of the Project since then. (R. Vol. I, 
pp. 150-51.) At the District Court, the Board submitted an Affidavit of Karl D. Vogt in Support 
of Motion for Order Granting Possession of Real Property, and included copies of annual 
minutes approving STIP. (R. Vol. I, pp. 164-230, Vol. II, pp. 232-353.) Additionally, the Board 
included portions of the annual STIP for FY 06-13 listing Project Key No. 09791. (R. Vol. I, pp. 
196-97,210-11,229-30, Vol. II, pp. 247-48, 259-60.) 
A closer review of the STIP documents relied on by the Board reveals that the description 
associated with Project Key No. 09791 is infinitely broad and simply labels such project as 
"Major WideninglReconstruction" or more simply "Reconstruction." Id. The only description 
of the land encompassed by Project Key No. 09791 appears to be through the identification of 
mile markers, which varied with each annual STIP "approval.,,9 
While the Board has submitted voluminous materials demonstrating that it approved "the 
Project," none of these materials discuss the propriety of condemnation by the Board, nor do they 
9 FY 2006-2010 STIP listed Project Key No. 09791 as mileposts 438.9-469.8. FY 2007-2011, 
2008-2011, and 2009-2013 STIPs listed Project Key no. 09791 as mileposts 445-451.3. FY 
2010-2013 STIP listed Project Key No. 09791 as mileposts 448-449.8. (R. Vol. I, pp. 97,211, 
20; Vol. II, pp. 48, 60.) 
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even come reasonably close to identifying Grathol's property (or any other specific property) as 
being condenmed. It is not even clear from the record submitted by the Board whether the Grathol 
property lies between any of the milepost markers included in the annual STIP programs. 
The Board's argument is that its approval of "the Project" encompassing the Grathol 
property, is a tacit pre-approval of an Order ofCondenmation required under I.C. § 7-707(6). This 
argument completely eviscerates the requirements of I.C. § 7-707(6), that the Board enter an Order 
of Condenmation "which clearly identifies all property rights to be acquired" and attach such 
binding Order to the Complaint. Such logic is utterly unsupported under Idaho's statutory scheme 
and Idaho's case law requiring an exact and deliberate process to be taken prior to condenmation 
being initiated. 
Despite the volume of submissions, at no point in any of these documents does the Board 
approve the condenmation of Grathol's property or even identify the property to be acquired. 
Instead, these financial planning documents vaguely describe a "reconstruction" project which may 
or may not encompass Highway 95 from milepost markers 438 to 469. Such vagueness may suffice 
for pursuit of federal funding but does not substitute for procedural requirements of the Idaho Code. 
At no point in these minutes and approvals has the Board ever considered the condenmation of 
Grathol's property and it is unclear if the Board is even aware that the property exists. Simply put, 
financial approval of "the Project" does not equate to approval of condenmation under I.C. § 7-
707(6). 
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c. Idaho Code § 40-315 does not excuse the Board from compliance with the 
requirements ofIdaho Code 7-707. 
In what can only be characterized as a desperate justification for its own inaction, the Board 
argues that because the Idaho Legislature itself has approved "the Project," it has impliedly 
approved the instant condemnation. The Board cites I.C. § 40-315 to argue that the condemnation 
of Grathol's property is expressly provided by the Idaho Legislature. This argument borders on 
ridiculous. I.C. § 40-315 clearly is not intended to substitute for the Board's judgment in exercising 
the power of eminent domain. Instead, this statute is merely another funding mechanism giving the 
Board the discretion to designate projects to be funded by bond proceeds. Nowhere in I.e. § 40-315 
does the Idaho Legislature excuse the Board from following the eminent domain procedures when 
acquiring private property. 
This much is clear: The Board has not taken any specific action to authorize the Grathol 
condemnation, explicitly or implicitly. In contravention of I.C. § 7-707(6), requiring the Board 
execute an Order of Condemnation which clearly identifies the property rights to be acquired, the 
Board has simply delegated the function to an administrator. The Board fails to identifY any legal 
authority for such delegation and its position contravenes the express statutory provisions reserving 
such power to the Board only. As "cover," the Board argues that it approved the Order either via its 
armual STIP funding approval or even more remotely, through the Idaho Legislature'S enactment of 
I.C. § 40-315. None of these theories absolve the Board of its statutory mandate to evaluate and 
consider the impacts of each condemnation action and the property interests involved. Idaho's 
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Legislature has specifically placed those burdens on the Board and only the Board can fulfill those 
powers and duties. It cannot adopt an internal "policy" to delegate such critical functions to an 
employee or agent. Because it· is uncontested that the Board never approved the Order, the 
Complaint fails to satisfy the requirements ofIdaho Code § 7-707(6). 
2. The description of property and rights to be acquired by the Order of Condemnatiou 
conflicts with the description of lands to be taken contained in the Complaint. 
In addition to the Board's failure to properly approve this condemnation, the proposed 
taking remains vague and undefined in violation ofLe. § 7-707(6). Plaintiff, Board included in 
its Complaint a legal description for the real property sought to be acquired, as Exhibit A. (R. 
Vol. I, pp. 7-9.) It also included a map showing the right-of-way and the project route as it 
traverses Grathol's property, as Exhibit B. (R. Vol. I, pp. 10-15.) The inclusion of the legal 
description and map is required by I.C. §§ 7-707(4) and (5) in order to accurately identify the 
location and boundaries of the property to be taken. 
I.C. § 7-707(6) requires that the Order of Condemnation be included in the Complaint and 
that it "sets forth and clearly identifies all property rights to be acquired including rights to and from 
the public way, and permanent and temporary easements known or reasonably known to the 
condemning authority." Here, the Order attached to the Complaint simply contains a general 
recitation of authority to condemn and includes the following identification of property rights: "That 
the parcel so designated and shown on said project plans is necessary to the construction of said 
project and the construction of said project is impossible without the acquisition of said parcel." (R. 
VoL I, p. 16.) The Order identifies the Grathol property as Parcel No. 19 which corresponds to the 
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legal description attached to the Complaint, but the Order then goes on to provide in paragraph 4 the 
following: 
That the rights of access to and from the remainiog property 
belonging to the record owners be as follows: 
* * * 
e. Rights of Access to and From Sylvan RoadlRoberts Road 
Extension 
In association with the Project, the Idaho Transportation Department 
is in the process of extending Sylvan Road to tie ioto Roberts Road. 
Upon the completion of the roadway extension, the record owners 
will have the opportunity to obtain additional access and access 
rights to and from the remainiog property and Sylvan RoadlRoberts 
Road that did not previously exist and was not otherwise available 
prior to the project. The additional access will be subject to the rules, 
regulations, policies, and permit requirements of the applicable 
government agency. 
CR. Vol. I, p. 17.) The Order contains an express declaration that the Department is extending 
Sylvan Road to tie ioto Roberts Road in connection with the project. However, the project plans 
and legal description of the proposed condemnation contained in the Complaint do not contaio any 
mention of the extension of Sylvan Road. (R. Vol.I, pp. 7-15.) 
Sylvan Road is a north/south road runniog parallel to U.S. 95. Sylvan terminates at 
Highway 54, which is the south boundary of the Grathol property. No portion of Sylvan Road 
crosses the Grathol property. Roberts Road lies directly to the north of the Grathol property running 
north/south and lioes up with Sylvan Road. lo However, there is no easement, dedication, right-of-
10 For the convenience of the Court, reference is made to CR. Vol. I, p. 11.), which depicts the two 
roads in their relative positions to the Grathol property. On that exhibit, lTD has interposed a dotted 
line across the Grathol property and several properties to the north, demonstrating the alignment of 
the roads. This area can be contrasted with the proposed "take" which is blackened in on that 
same page. 
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way or any other right of the Board to "extend" Sylvan Road across the Grathol property and no 
road physically exists on the Grathol property. 
With this, the Order has an apparent conflict and ambiguity between the description of 
the property rights and interests to be acquired and in the description of such property contained 
in the Complaint. This is significant because it is precisely the type of conflict/ambiguity that 
caused I.C. § 7-707(6) to be recently amended. 
Subparagraph 6 of I.C. § 7-707 was added by Idaho's Legislature in 2006 via Senate Bill 
No. 1243. (R Vol. 1, pp. 126-130.) The Legislature enacted I.C. § 7-707(6) to specifically 
require an Order of Condemnation to be included in the Complaint. Prior to that amendment, no 
Order was required. The purpose of the amendment is shown in the Bill's Statement of Purpose: 
This amendment to existing code shall require condemnors to 
clearly set forth in the complaint a description of the property and 
property rights to be acquired. This will remove any ambiguity 
about which rights are being acquired as part of the 
condemnation, and shall give the condemnor the right to make 
that decision, via an order or other resolution entered by the 
condemnor. This will prevent any ambiguity or argument about 
what is or is not being taken via condemnation. 
(R Vol. I, p. 130) (emphasis added). The legislative history demonstrates that the 2006 changes 
and amendments were made to ensure that an Order of Condemnation was attached to a complaint 
in order to clarify what rights were being taken in the condemnation. 
The Board argued inter alia to the District Court that the Complaint in a condemnation 
action controls the issue of what property is being condemned and the Order of Condemnation is 
"irrelevant," citing Ada County Highway District v. Sharp, 135 Idaho 888, 26 P.3d 1225 (Ct.App. 
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2001) and Winder v. Canyon Vista Family Ltd Partnership, 148 Idaho 718, 228 P.3d 985 (2010). 
Both of these cases, however, are distinguishable from the instant controversy because both 
involved condemnation actions initiated prior to the 2006 amendments to I.C. § 7-707. 
In Sharp, the issue was whether the description required in a complaint for condemnation 
under I.C. § 7-707 controlled an administrative order of a highway district under I.C. § 40-1310(3). 
The Sharp court found that I.C. § 7-707 was more specific and controlling than I.C. § 40-1310(3) 
which only provided prima facie evidence of public use. 135 Idaho at 891, 26 P.3d. 1225. In 
Winder v. Canyon Vista Family Ltd. Partnership, 148 Idaho 718, 228 P.3d 985 (2010), the appeal 
arose from an action for condemnation initiated in 2004. Relying on Sharp, the Winder Court 
agreed that the order of condemnation was irrelevant, but the trial court's admission of the order did 
not affect a substantial right of the State because it did not present a conflict with the complaint. Id. 
at 726-27, 228 P.3d. 993-94. While the Winder decision is instructive as to the Court's analysis of 
I.C. § 7-707 as it read in 2004, it is not instructive on I.C. § 7-707 as amended by the Idaho 
Legislature in 2006 in its present form. 
It is apparent from both the specific language of Idaho Code § 7-707(6) and the 
accompanying statement of purpose that the legislative intent of this provision is to require the 
condemnor to clearly identify and delineate all interests that it intends to condemn. Without such 
a requirement, property owners would be left with uncertainty as to exactly what interests were 
being impacted and what the value of those interests may be. Further, with the addition of 
subpart (6), the Order and description binds the condemning entity to the plans attached to the 
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Complaint. This is of a huge significance to a condemnee since a condemnor cannot then 
arbitrarily change the scope of its "take" in the middle of the lawsuit to gain advantage. 
In contrast to the Winder decision, the Order here clearly demonstrates an intention to 
extend Sylvan Road across the Grathol property; "In association with the Project, the Idaho 
Transportation Department is in the process of extending Sylvan Road to tie into Roberts Road." 
(R. Vol. I, p. 17.) The only way Sylvan Road can tie into Roberts Road is through Grathol's 
property. However, the Complaint and description of the property and rights to be acquired 
contained in the Complaint contain no mention of the Sylvan Road extension. Thus, the Board (or 
more accurately, the Director) thought the impact of the Sylvan Road extension important enough to 
specifically mention in the Order, but did not consider it of enough import to include in the 
description of rights being impacted in the Complaint. Thus, unlike the facts stated in Winder, the 
Condemnation Order here directly conflicts with the Complaint. 
The Board's contention that the Order is "irrelevant" has no merit in light of the 2006 
amendments. Essentially, the Board is arguing that the addition of LC. § 7-707(6) did not add 
anything to the eminent domain proceedings, and that the Board can ignore the amendment. This 
would make the addition of I.C. § 7-707(6) a superfluous act of the Legislature. It is incumbent 
upon a court to give a statute an interpretation that will not render it a nullity. Hecla Min. Co. v. 
Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 108 Idaho 147, 151,697 P.2d 1161,1165 (1985). Further the Board's 
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arguments completely ignores and contravenes the intent of the Idaho Legislature in adding I. C. 
§ 7-707(6) by removing any ambiguity or uncertainty about what is or isn't being condemned. I I 
The Board's failure to clearly address the true scope of the proposed take have a very real 
and direct affect on Grathol's rights as a property owner. Grathol is a developer of commercial 
sites. In additional to acquiring the property, Grathol applied for and received a rezone to a 
commercial designation from Kootenai County and filed development applications with the 
County for approval. Those plans were necessarily based on the configuration of the lands and 
roadways as they currently exist. However, the uncertainty created by the Board's inability to 
acc\lrately· define the scope of its take makes any development application questionable and 
indefinitely delays Grathol's free use of its property. 
The Order contains the specific reference to the extension and development of Sylvan 
Road directly through Grathol' s property which are not identified or described in the Complaint. As 
such, the Board has contradicted itself and created an enormous burden and uncertainty on the 
property owner. The Board's actions have created a very real and serious conflict and directly 
contravene the intent of I.C. § 7-707 to provide the landowner with a "clear identification of all 
property rights to be acquired" and eliminate any ambiguity about what is or is not being taken. 
Because the Board has failed to provide such a clear and unambiguous identification of all property 
rights and interests, it has failed to comply with I.C. § 7-707 and failed to file a valid condemnation 
11 Indeed, the Board had the opportunity to review and revise Board Policy No. B-03-0 1 after the 
2006 amendments. Instead of addressing the newly added requirements of I.e. § 7-707(6) and 
the requirement that an "order of condemnation ... entered by the plaintiff' be included in the 
Complaint, on August 20, 2008 the Board simply chose to continue its prior policy of delegating 
such authority to its director to authorize orders of condemnation. R. Vol. II., p. 276. 
-32-
complaint. As such, the District Court committed error in granting the Board's motion for 
possession under I.C. § 7-721(2). 
II. THE BOARD FAILED TO MAKE A GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO BARGAIN FOR 
AND ACQUIRE ALL PROPERTY IMPLICATED IN THE CONDEMNATION 
ACTION PRIOR TO REQUESTING AN ORDER FOR POSSESSION FROM THE 
DISTRICT COURT. 
In Idaho condenmation proceedings, a plaintiff may request inunediate possession of the 
real property under I.C. § 7-721. A plaintiff may be granted possession of the property after a 
judicial determination of just compensation has been made and paid into the court. I.C. § 7-72l. 
Proceedings for early possession are apparently rarely contested. 
Upon request by the plaintiff, the court holds a hearing to make a judicial determination of 
whether a plaintiff has met the four elements of I.C. § 7-721(2)(a)-(d). Here, subsection (d) is at 
issue. It provides that the court shall determine whether or not plaintiff has sought, in good faith, to 
purchase the property to be condenmed. 
The Board argued to the District Court that it had satisfied element (d) by offering evidence 
that lTD offered to Grathol its estimate of the value encompassing the "take" portion of Grathol's 
property and such offer was rejected. The Board's valuation only encompassed the physical take of 
the Grathol property and is identified as the blacked out portion of the Grathol property at R. Vo!' I, 
p. 11. The offer of compensation and underlying appraisal did not include any consideration of the 
extension of Sylvan Road to Roberts Road across the Grathol property as enumerated in the Order 
attached to the Complaint. (Tr. pp. 30-31, 11. 3-25, 1-3.) Instead, the offer of compensation only 
considered the physical take described in the legal description attached to the Complaint. There is 
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no factual dispute that the Board's offer failed to consider or include any impacts of the Sylvan 
Road extension. Instead, the argument is over the Board's failure to include any consideration or 
offer for the proposed extension of Sylvan Road. 
When taking private property for public purposes, all incidents of property ownership are 
subject to an assessment of value. In State ex reI. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d 60 
(1958), the landowne~ appealed an award of damages in an eminent domain proceeding, arguing 
that the trial court committed error in refusing to instruct the jury on all elements of damages 
suffered as a result of the condemnation. The Fonburg Court held: 
These elements of damage consist of the reasonable market value of 
the land taken, together with all improvements thereon located and 
taken in this proceeding, severance damages to the remainder, 
through which the road runs due to its severance from the whole, 
which severance damage would include, among other damage 
sustained, the curtailment and restriction of access to highway No. 
95, as formerly enjoyed, and access to the railroad as enjoyed prior to 
the construction of the new road. (Internal citations omitted.) . .. 
The section inter alia provides that the court, jury or referee, after 
hearing the evidence, must assess the value of the property sought to 
be taken and improvements thereon pertaining to the realty and each 
and every estate and interest therein ... 
Id. at 280, 365 P.2d 66 (emphasis added). The impact of the Fonburg decision is that all 
damages incurred as a result of a condemnation action are compensable and not limited to only 
the physical take, but instead extend to each and every "estate and interest" impacted. The 
plarmed extension of Sylvan Road across Grathol's property certainly fits this description. 
State ex rei. Rich v. Bahr, 83 Ipaho 475, 365 P.2d 216 (1961) examined the requirements 
of "good faith" offers to purchase under Idaho Code § 7-707(6) as a prerequisite to filing an 
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action for condemnation. 12 The landowner disputed the State's claim of good faith negotiation 
attempts and sought through discovery copies of the State's appraisals of the property. The State 
objected to the requests and the trial court sustained the objections. [d. at 478,365 P.2d 217. At 
trial, the court sustained the State's objections to cross-examination of the State's witness 
regarding valuation as not tending to prove or disprove the matter of good faith. [d. at 79, 365 
P.2d 218. On appeal, the landowner contested the trial court's finding that the negotiations were 
sufficient to satisfY the good faith requirement of the Code. [d. at 478-79,365 P.2d 218. The 
State argued that the mere act of making an offer was sufficient to satisfy the statutory good faith 
requirements. The Bahr Court disagreed and rejected the notion that merely making an offer 
satisfies the statute. It reasoned: 
Evidence tending to prove or establish good faith [or lack of good 
faith] in the attempt to 'purchase the lands so sought to be taken' 
or to 'settle *** for the damages' are relevant and material to the 
first issue. All matters tending to prove or establish inability [or 
ability] to make a reasonable bargain or settlement are likewise 
relevant and material to the second issue. 
[d. at 478-79, 365 P.2d218. 
* * * 
[I]t must be kept in mind that the requirements of I.e. § 7-707(6) 
are not to be lightly disregarded, and must be satisfied before an 
action in eminent domain may be entertained. This provision 
discloses reluctance of the legislature to award a remedy by 
12 Then, I.C. § 7-707(6) required an allegation by the plaintiff that it sought, in good faith, to 
purchase the property and settle for severance damages and that plaintiff was unable to make any 
reasonable bargain therefore prior to initiating an action for condemnation of lands on which the 
landowner resided. I.C. § 7-707(6) appears to be currently codified at I.C. § 7-707(7) (emphasis 
added). 
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eminent domain, harsh in its nature, when the same end could be 
effected by contract between the parties .... In order to satisfy the 
statutory requirement there must be a bona fide attempt to agree, 
with a bona fide offer made and reasonable effort made to induce 
the owner to accept it. ... What amounts to 'good faith' and 
'reasonable bargain' in any particular case depends upon the facts 
presented, and such matters are for the triers of facts. A 
perfunctory attempt to purchase or settle is not sufficient; .... 
Id. at 480,365 P.2d 219 (emphasis added). The Bahr Court reversed the judgment and remanded 
for new trial the issue of the State's compliance with I.C. § 7-707. The Bahr Court's decision is 
instructive on what is required to demonstrate "good faith" negotiations in the condemnation 
context. Good faith requires a bona fide offer and more than a perfunctory negotiation. 
Other jurisdictions' rulings on the issue are instructive as well. In City of Cape Giradeau 
v. Robertson, 615 S.W. 2d 526 (Mo. Ct.App. 1981), the Missouri Court of Appeals considered 
the trial court's dismissal of a city's action for condemnation of a construction easement. The 
landowner filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the city failed to plead and prove a prerequisite 
good faith offer and subsequent rejection of that offer, as required under the statute. Id. at 529. 
After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that none of the city's offers contemplated full 
remuneration for any reduction in the market value of the parcels of land due to the designated 
easement. Id. On appeal, the city argued that its evidence showed that it had made offers to the 
landowner prior to the litigation and the landowner either failed to respond or outright rejected 
them. Id. at 530. The Cape Giradeau Court found that the city's offers did not contemplate any 
remuneration for burdening the parcels in question with the perpetual easement. Id. 
The City, through its negotiator, simply failed to consider and to 
evaluate as an element of damage the possible loss which might have 
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been caused by burdening the parcels in question with a permanent 
construction easement. Obviously this differs significantly from an 
honest but incorrect evaluation of the effect of imposing the 
easement. In effect, the City's conduct is no different than the City 
making an offer for one parcel of land or an easement over it and 
then petitioning to condemn a different parcel or easement. The City 
made no effort to pay for the "permanent construction easement" 
defined in its condemnation petition and, therefore, its offers could 
not be "good faith" offers. 
Id. at 531 (emphasis added). Because the city failed to demonstrate "good faith" offers to settle 
prior to filing its lawsuit, the order of dismissal was upheld. 
In this case, the Board sought early possession of Grathol's property, under I.C. § 7-721(2), 
less than one month after filing its Complaint. The Board claimed that it satisfied the requirement 
of good faith efforts to negotiate for the property and rights, but was unable to successfully come to 
terms. (R. Vol. I, pp. 70-71.) The Board presented evidence at the hearing that its offer was based 
on an evaluation of the physical take of Grathol' s property but did not consider or evaluate any 
impacts of the extension of Sylvan Road. (Tr. pp. 30-31, 11. 3-25, 1-3.) In fact, the Board's 
appraiser, Stanley Moe, testified that he had not been asked to consider or evaluate any impacts 
relating to the Sylvan Road extension. (Tr. p. 38,11.1-9.) 
While Idaho law holds that "good faith" in such negotiations depends on a factual 
assessment, the Board's offers cannot be found to constitute good faith if the Board wholly refuses 
to consider and evaluate the impacts on all property rights to be acquired through its condemnation. 
As clearly identified in the Board's Order, in counection with the Project, lTD is "in the process of 
extending Sylvan Road to tie into Roberts Road." (R. Vol. I, p. 17.) (emphasis added.) Yet the 
Board's valuation conspicuously omits any reference to this extension and fails to offer a single 
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penny for the impacts of such extension. If Idaho law requires that any and all damages accruing to 
the properly owner including "each and every estate and interest therein" are to be evaluated by a 
jury in deciding just compensation, then it is axiomatic that public entities must also consider and 
evaluate the same damages when making pre-litigation offers. Failing to do so, the public entity has 
not utilized "good faith." 
Good faith requires, at a minimum, an acknowledgement of the scope of each taking. 
Arguably, a public entity could attribute zero value towards an aspect of the taking and such 
valuation might in good faith because there was at least a discussion and recognition of the interest 
and impact on the landowner. However, failing to even acknowledge and evaluate the impacts of 
the take on the knoWn aspects of a landowner's ownership cannot qualify as "good faith" and 
instead demonstrates a willing indifference to the impacts of the condemnation on the landowner. 
See e.g., Cape Giradeau, supra. 
The Board's offer to Grathol and its appraisal do not contain any valuation or discussion 
of the proposed expansion and construction of Sylvan Road across Grathol's property. Instead 
of considering and valuing the take as a whole, the Board appears to be attempting to execute a 
series of takings in a piece-meal fashion in order to avoid paying full just compensation for the 
condemnation that will segment Grathol's property once and then segment it again. 
What is apparent from the Board's actions, its Complaint and the Order of Condemnation 
is two-fold. First, this "Project" contemplates the extension of Sylvan Road directly through 
Grathol's property to connect to Roberts Road. The Board fully intends on expanding Sylvan 
Road directly through Grathol's property in order to benefit the traveling public. Second, the 
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Board has considered the extension of Sylvan Road enough to regard it III the Order of 
Condertmation but not to offer any just compensation for it. 
The Board has not demonstrated a good faith effort to purchase the property as required 
under I.C. § 7-721(2), which is compounded by the Board's failure to include a clear 
unambiguous description of all rights to be acquired under I.C. § 7-707(6). What amounts to 
good faith and reasonable bargaining depends on a factual inquiry, but there must be at a 
minimum reasonable conduct and a bona fide offer. State ex reZ. Rich v. Bair, 83 Idaho 475, 365 
P.2d 216 (1961). The Board's failure to consider value and offer compensation for the Sylvan 
Road extension through Grathol's property is unreasonable, in light of its own express 
declaration that the Department is extending Sylvan Road. Because the Board failed to meet 
each element of I.C. § 7-721 it should not have been granted early possession, and the District 
Court erred in doing so. 
III. GRATHOL'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. 
I.C. § 12-117 provides: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil 
judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a 
city, a county or other taxing district and a person, the court shall 
award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees 
and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party against 
whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law. 
This Court has held that I.C. § 12-117 is the only basis upon which to seek an award of 
attorney's fees against a state agency. See, Lake CDA Investments, LLC, v. Idaho Department of 
Lands, 149 Idaho 274, 233 P.3d 721 (2010); State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 
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Idaho 718, 947 P.2d 391 (1997). LC. § 12-117 authorizes the awarding of attorney fees on 
appeal as well. Daw ex reI. Daw v. School Dist. 91 Bd. of Trs .. 136 Idaho 806, 41 PJd 234 
(2001); citing, Rural Kootenai Org .. Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs. 133 Idaho 833, 993 P.2d 596 
(2000)). The two-part test ofLC. § 12-117 applies on appeal as well. Daw. 136 Idaho at 808, 41 
P Jd 236. In the event Grathol is the prevailing party in this appeal, the first part of the test is 
met. 
This Court has held that the purpose of the statute is two-fold: (1) to serve as a deterrent 
to groundless or arbitrary agency action; and (2) to provide a remedy for persons who have borne 
unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending or attempting to correct mistakes agencies 
should never had made. Bogner v. State Dept. of Revenue & Taxation, State Tax Comm'n, 107 
Idaho 854, 859, 693 P.2d 1056, 1061 (1984). When a government or state agency has no 
authority to take a particular action, it acts without a reasonable basis in fact or law and an award 
of fees under LC. § 12-117 is appropriate. Univ. of Utah Hosp. v. Ada County Bd. of Com'rs, 
143 Idaho 808, 812, 153 P.3d 1154, 1158, (2007); citing, Fischer v. City of Ketchum. 141 Idaho 
349,356,109 P.3d 1091, 1098 (2005). 
The Board's Complaint and petition for early possession were frivolous and without 
foundation because the Board failed to satisfy the express statutory requirements ofLC. §§ 7-707 
and 7-721. The Board ignored the plain language of the statutes requiring an "order of 
condenmation entered by the plaintiff' which clearly sets forth and identifies all property rights 
to be acquired. The Board has exhibited willful indifference to the 2006 legislative amendment 
and simply continued its prior practice of delegating to an administrator its non-delegable 
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statutory authority to condemn. The confusion and ambiguity created by the conflicting 
descriptions of the property rights to be acquired were created solely by the Board's failure to 
strictly adhere to the eminent domain statutes. Last, the Board acted unreasonably when it 
stubbornly refused to consider and evaluate the impacts of the Sylvan Road extension, which 
were expressly included in the Order of Condemnation. 
The Board has completely disregarded the very statutes which grant it the authority to 
condemn in the first place. Further, the Board relies on unpersuasive legal authority which pre-
dates the 2006 legislative amendments and does not to address the specific issues raised in this 
litigation. These actions represent the ultimate groundless and arbitrary actions which I.e. § 12-
117 is intended to prevent. Grathol should be awarded its attorney fees and costs under I.C. § 12-
117. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Grathol respectfully requests the Court to reverse the Order 
Granting Possession of Real Property of the District Court and grant Grathol requests for costs and 
attorney's fees on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of August, 2011. 
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